When a federal appeals court rules in your favor and remands for further proceedings, can the district court stop those proceedings while the other side seeks review in the U.S. Supreme Court?

You've recently won your federal appeal.  The other side sought rehearing but was unsuccessful.  Then they asked the appeals court to stay its mandate while they tried to seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court, but you successfully opposed that effort as well.  So the mandate issued.  [See this post for discussion of that process.]

But the case isn't completely over--the appeals court also remanded certain aspects of it back to the district court.  And the other side is now telling the district court to stay any remand proceedings while they seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.  Does the district court have any authority to do so?  And if there is a defined amount of money damages due under the appellate court's ruling, is the defendant now obligated to pay?  And what if the defendant posted a bond for that amount--can you move under Rule 65.1 to force the surety to pay?

The answer to these questions are discussed in this brief I filed in the district court in 2016 with co-counsel Michael Pasternak after we obtained a reversal and remand from the Sixth Circuit in Cranpark, Inc. v. Rogers Group, Inc.  This is the opposition brief filed by the other side, and this is our reply.  Additionally, here is the Rule 65.1 motion that we filed with the brief (seeking to force the surety to pay amounts owed on the supersedeas bond).  This is the Rule 65.1 opposition by the surety, and this is our Rule 65.1 reply.

Excerpts of our main brief and our reply appear below.  The court did not issue an opinion on these issues because the case settled.

[Cranpark's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Judgment and Mandate of the Sixth Circuit]



The Sixth Circuit has issued its judgment and mandate in this case, requiring this Court to enforce payment of the jury’s $15.6 million verdict now, and also to calculate and enforce payment of interest and costs owed. The grand total of these amounts is $32,416,991.20, and increasing daily. This Court has no authority to delay or stay proceedings, even if Rogers Group, Inc. (RGI) attempts certiorari review by the Supreme Court of the United States. 


This case was filed in 2004. The jury issued a $15.6 million verdict for Cranpark on November 22, 2013. (Doc. 193.) This Court entered judgment for Cranpark in that amount on December 2, 2013. (Doc. 200.) Cranpark moved to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest, which amounted to an additional $15.653 million, at that time. (Doc. 201.) RGI then moved to stay execution of the judgment pending resolution of its post-trial motions. (Doc. 203.) RGI argued that it did not need to post a bond because it was financially strong, with over $400 million in assets and over $500 million in sales. (Doc. 214 at 6.) This Court concluded, however, that a stay was warranted only if RGI posted a bond for the $15.6 million verdict. (Id.) The next day, RGI complied and filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of $15.6 million. (Doc. 216.) The bond named RGI as the principal and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America as surety. (Doc. 216-1.) 

The bond stated that RGI and Travelers are “held and firmly bound unto CRANPARK, INC., Plaintiff, in the full and just sum of FIFTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND and 00/100 ($15,600,000.00) Dollars, to be paid to the said Plaintiff, CRANPARK, INC. . . .” (Id.) The bond further stated that it applied not simply to RGI’s forthcoming post-trial motions, but also, if necessary, for “an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit . . . . (Id.) The terms made clear that, if there were an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the bond would be extinguished only if RGI were to “satisfy in full such modification of the Judgment and costs, interest and damages as may be adjudged and awarded by the Appellate Court . . . .” (Id. at 2.) If RGI did not make such payment to satisfy the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, the bond—and Travelers obligation to pay—would “remain in full force and effect.” (Id.) This Court approved the bond, staying execution of the judgment. (Doc. 217.) 

RGI then filed a Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, along with a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. (Docs. 218, 219.) This Court granted the Rule 50(b) motion, concluding that Cranpark lacked Article III standing. (Doc. 233.) This effectively eliminated the verdict, and the Court entered judgment for RGI on July 30, 2014. (Doc. 234.) This also eliminated the need for this Court to rule on Cranpark’s entitlement to prejudgment interest. Cranpark appealed, and RGI cross appealed. (Docs. 235, 238.) 

The case was assigned to a Sixth Circuit panel comprised of Judge Griffin, Judge Kethledge, and Judge Cleland. On April 22, 2016, the Sixth Circuit reversed in a 3-0 decision. (Ex. A. (“Op.”)) The Sixth Circuit held that Cranpark had Article III standing and was entitled to the full $15.6 million verdict. The Court further held that Cranpark was entitled to a full award of prejudgment interest under Ohio law, and post-judgment interest. The Court also concluded that none of RGI’s cross-appeal arguments had merit. The final sentence of the opinion states that the judges “REMAND the case with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and calculate the interest owed on the judgment.” (Op. at 22.) The Sixth Circuit also issued its “JUDGMENT” in this case the same day, which states that the case “is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.” (Sixth Circuit Judgment, Ex. B.) 

RGI sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, claiming that the Court’s decision was mistaken. The Sixth Circuit denied RGI’s hearing requests on May 31, 2016. No judge of the Sixth Circuit requested a vote for en banc review. RGI then sought to stay issuance of the mandate while RGI begins the process of seeking certiorari review in the Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit denied that extraordinary request as well, on June 21, 2016. On June 22, 2016, counsel for Cranpark wrote an email to counsel for RGI requesting a check for the $15.6 million as called for by the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and suggesting a call with this Court to set a hearing date regarding pre- and post-judgment interest. On June 24, counsel for RGI responded, stating that the “request for a check is premature for several reasons,” explaining that “there is no judgment currently on file” and that RGI intends to seek a stay at the Supreme Court pending review of a petition for a writ of certiorari. On June 26, counsel for Cranpark responded, stating that the Sixth Circuit’s judgment is the operative judgment in the case and that Cranpark is entitled to payment regardless of RGI’s efforts to seek a stay from the Supreme Court or certiorari review. The Sixth Circuit’s mandate issued on June 28, 2016, returning case to this Court. (Ex. C). As explained below, this Court has no authority to delay or stay proceedings, and Cranpark is entitled to payment. 


I. This Court has no authority to delay or stay proceedings as dictated by the Sixth Circuit’s mandate. 

This Court now “must implement both the letter and spirit of the mandate . . . .” Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 549 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Even if RGI seeks an unlikely stay from the Supreme Court, this Court still has no authority to stay these proceedings. The grounds for RGI to seek such a stay by the Supreme Court arise under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), which provides the authority for stays pending certiorari review. District courts in the Sixth Circuit have explained the well-established principles that district courts have no power to stop or delay proceedings in these circumstances: “The federal courts have consistently relied upon § 2101(f) for the rule that district courts lack jurisdiction to stay the execution of an appellate court judgment.” Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., No. 07-238, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93282, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2011). “The power of a district court to grant a stay of judgment pending appeal . . . terminates when the Court of Appeals issues its mandate . . . .” Id. at 6; see also Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 11-12557, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111023, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2014) (same).1 

In Ventas, for example, the district court entered judgment against the defendant for more than $101 million. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2. The parties agreed to stay execution pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit, putting in place a line of credit to secure the plaintiff against loss. Id. at *3. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award and issued its mandate. Id. The plaintiff informed the district court that it was entitled to payment, and the defendant argued that no payment should occur because “appeal to the United States Supreme Court is still possible.” Id. at *4. The court rejected this argument, noting that it lacked authority to stay the Sixth Circuit’s judgment. Id. The court concluded by stating as follows: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Ventas is entitled to judgment on the mandate of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the amount of $101,672,807.00, plus interest.” Id. at *7. 

A similar recent example involving a $49 million judgment illustrates that the proper course is for RGI to pay Cranpark the full amount owed and simply reserve its right to seek further review in the Supreme Court, should it wish to take that shot. In Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture LLP, No. 08-119 (S.D. Tex. 2014), the plaintiff obtained $26 million in actual damages, $4.5 million in prejudgment interest, and additional costs and interest for a total judgment of approximately $49 million. The defendant filed a supersedeas bond for that full amount, pending appeal. The appellate court ultimately affirmed and issued its mandate. The day the mandate issued, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding payment. (Wellogix Doc. 376 at 2 (Ex. D).) The defendant refused, stating that payment was “premature” because the defendant would be seeking certiorari review in the Supreme Court. (Id.) The plaintiff explained to the district court that payment should occur and that the district court had no authority to delay execution of the appellate court’s mandate. (Id.) At the same time, the plaintiff filed a motion under Civil Rule 65.1 to proceed against the surety on the bond, stating that the surety was now obligated to pay the full amount. (Wellogix Doc. 377 (Ex. E).) (Rule 65.1 enables a judgment winner to move for payment on a bond directly against the surety through a streamlined process in the same case.) The defendant continued to argue that it did not have to make the payment pending its certiorari review. (Wellogix Doc. 379 (Ex. F)). Relying on the principles stated above, the court stated that it has “serious doubt as to whether it has any authority to continue its stay after the Fifth Circuit’s mandate,” and further stated that, regardless, it refuses to exercise such authority. (Wellogix Doc. 383 (Ex. G)). Within days of this order, the defendant paid the plaintiff the full $49 million owed, “reserving its right to seek further review” in the Supreme Court. (Wellogix Doc. 390 (Letter from counsel to the Court (Ex. H)). The defendant further noted that because full payment to the plaintiff occurred, the pending Rule 65.1 motion to proceed against the surety was moot, and the surety did not have to cover the payment. (Id.) The defendant then filed an unopposed motion to terminate the bond, on the basis that the defendant had “tendered payment of the full judgment of $49,050,653.23 to Wellogix.” (Wellogix Doc. 391 (Ex. I).) The district court found that the defendant “has tendered payment of the full judgment and interest,” and accordingly entered an order terminating the bond, releasing the surety of any obligations. (Wellogix Doc. 392 (Ex. J).) 

So too here, the Sixth Circuit’s mandate in this case requires RGI to pay Cranpark all amounts owed, regardless of RGI’s efforts to seek certiorari review. These amounts are discussed below. 

II. RGI (or the surety, Travelers) must pay Cranpark the $15.6 million verdict amount immediately, and RGI must further pay full prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, and costs. 

A. RGI must pay the $15.6 million now, and Travelers is also liable for this amount on the bond. 

Whatever additional calculations need to occur related to interest or costs, Cranpark is entitled to the $15.6 million verdict payment from RGI immediately. See, e.g., Energy Nuclear Palisades, LLC v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 225, 229 (Ct. Cl. 2015) (“A trial court has the authority on remand to enter partial judgment as to a sum certain in damages for which a defendant is liable as a result of the court of appeals’s mandate, even if the remand order requires the trial court to adjudicate other requests for damages by plaintiff arising out of the same legal claim.”) (emphasis added) (citing King Inst. Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Tembenis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 2013-5029, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 26081 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2013) (lower court should “perform any actions necessary to complete prompt payment of the undisputed portion of the judgment”) (emphasis added); see also United States ex rel Gonter v. Gen. Dynamics, No. 4:01-cv-634, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92512, at *12–14 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2006) (Polster, J.) (“[The defendant] should simply pay [the plaintiff] the amount of the judgment that is not in dispute,” even if other parts of the judgment will be appealed). 

Because RGI is refusing to make this $15.6 million payment, Travelers is now immediately liable to make that payment to Cranpark under the terms of the bond. Thus, like Wellogix, Cranpark is contemporaneously filing a Rule 65.1 motion to enforce payment from Travelers to Cranpark for the full bond amount of $15.6 million. As noted above, the bond obligates Travlers to pay immediately unless RGI were to “satisfy in full such modification of the Judgment and costs, interest and damages as may be adjudged and awarded by the Appellate Court . . . .” (Doc 216-1 at 2 (Supersedeas Bond).) RGI has not satisfied the judgment as awarded by the Sixth Circuit, so Travelers must issue payment of $15.6 million to Cranpark immediately. 

[brief continues and addresses other issues]


1 Federal courts across the country are in agreement that district courts lack authority to stay proceedings after the court of appeals has issued its mandate. See, e.g., Gander v. FMC Corp., 733 F. Supp. 1346, 1347 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (citing Newton v. Consol. Gas. Co., 258 U.S. 165, 177 (1922)); see also In re Stumes, 681 F.2d 524, 525 (8th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Lentz, 352 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725 (E.D. Va. 2005); Studiengesellschaft Kohle, mbH v. Novamont Corp., 578 F. Supp. 78, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mister v. Illinois Cent. Gulf. R. Co., 680 F. Supp. 297, 299 (S.D. Ill. 1988); Kozman v. Trans World Airlines, 145 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).  



[Cranpark's Reply in Support of Motion to Enforce Judgment and Mandate of the Sixth Circuit]



Rogers Group is ignoring the most basic point about the Sixth Circuit’s mandate: The $15.6 million is a fixed damage sum that is now final and payable—regardless of the Sixth Circuit’s mandate that Cranpark is also entitled to prejudgment interest and regardless of Rogers’ potential of seeking certiorari review. The same was true in Ventas and Wellogix. Those courts ordered payment of the fixed damages determined by the appellate court and then moved on to the unresolved part of the case on remand. The same should occur here. The mandate requires this Court to order Rogers to pay the $15.6 million to Cranpark now. 

As for prejudgment interest, even if the calculation were staggered by accrual dates and applied the revised prejudgment statute’s interest rates for all years (as Rogers proposes), the total interest due is $13,164,685.77. 

I. Cranpark is Entitled to Payment of the $15.6 Million Fixed Amount Immediately. 

A. When an appellate court mandate provides for a fixed damage amount, that amount is immediately payable, regardless of unresolved issues for remand. 

Just like this case, Ventas and Wellogix also had two parts: A fixed damage award, and an additional damage amount to be resolved on remand. In Ventas, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to $101 million in fixed compensatory damages, and the district court was to determine punitive damages on remand. Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., No. 07-238, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93282, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2011). In Wellogix, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to $49 million in fixed damages, and the district court was to determine the award of statutory attorney fees on remand. Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture LLP, No. 08-119 (S.D. Tex. 2014); (Doc. 245-7 at 1, 10).

In both cases, the courts ordered immediate payment of the fixed damage amount over the defendant’s objections as they sought certiorari review—the exact same objections Rogers makes here. Those courts properly ordered immediate payment because the operative judgment is the judgment of the appellate court, and those operative judgments make clear that the first damage amount is fixed—so that part of the case is done (regardless of any effort to seek certiorari). After ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff that fixed amount, the district courts addressed the remaining aspect of the case. It is in this second, remaining part of the case that the district court has the “inherent authority” to control its docket and exercise its discretion to control the litigation. But the district court has no authority to stop payment of the fixed damages as mandated by the higher court. The key, then, is recognizing that these cases have two parts. One is fixed damages and requires payment immediately. The second is what the district court is to address on remand. 

With this basic framework in place, Rogers’ arguments can be summarily set aside, as shown below. 

B. The Sixth Circuit’s Judgment is the operative judgment here, and it includes a sum certain $15.6 million damage award payable now. 

Rogers first says there is no judgment to enforce. That is not true. “In essence, the court of appeals judgment super[s]edes the district court judgment and becomes the controlling or operative judgment.” Ventas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93282, at *4; see also William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, No. 05-612, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70129, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2011) (“The district court judgment has been superseded by the judgment of the Court of Appeals, even though the latter affirms the district court judgment in all respects.”). The Sixth Circuit’s “Judgment” is exactly what its title says it is. (Doc. 245-3 (“JUDGMENT”).) That judgment requires an award of a fixed amount: Reinstating the jury verdict of $15.6 million. That part of the case is over. It does not matter that there is a remand to calculate interest as well. See Ventas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93282, at *7 (“The fact that the Court of Appeals remanded a portion of the case to this Court for further action does not change the analysis.”). 

This is where Rogers reveals its most glaring omission. Cranpark explained in the opening brief that the $15.6 million fixed amount must be paid immediately, even though the interest calculation remained. In addition to Ventas and Wellogix, Cranpark relied on four more cases for this precise point. (Doc. 245-1 at 7 (E.g., Energy Nuclear Palisades, LLC v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 225, 229 (Ct. Cl. 2015) (“A trial court has the authority on remand to enter partial judgment as to a sum certain for damages for which a defendant is liable as a result of the court of appeals’s mandate, even if the remand order requires the trial court to adjudicate other requests for damages by plaintiff arising out of the same legal claim.”) (emphasis added).) Rogers provides no response. 

The flaw in Rogers’ position is easily exposed. Imagine if there were no interest award in this case. Cranpark would be entitled to payment of the fixed sum of $15.6 million immediately, under the mandate. Rogers is essentially saying that it should be able to refuse payment of that fixed amount because Rogers is in an even worse position where it owes an additional award of interest on that fixed sum. There is no authority for that illogical stance. This is also why sureties, such as Travelers, are liable under Rule 65.1 as soon as the appellate court’s mandate issues—regardless of a pending certiorari petition. See, e.g., WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., No. 09-1827, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64056, at *16–17 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2016) (regardless of petition for certiorari, defendant’s and sureties’ obligation to pay under supersedeas bond was triggered “when the District Court received the mandate from the Federal Circuit,” and “[n]othing more is required for the Defendant or Sureties to be required to make payment to [the plaintiff].”) Thus, Travelers is also now liable for the full $15.6 million under the terms of the bond. Simply put, Cranpark is entitled to the $15.6 million now. 

C. The only party “disrupting” the normal process is Rogers, which is refusing to release Cranpark’s money. 

Rogers next says that Cranpark “seeks to disrupt the orderly resolution” of this case by seeking payment of the fixed $15.6 million as mandated by the Sixth Circuit. Rogers again notes that it will be seeking certiorari review and that it could face “irreparable” harm by making the payment the Sixth Circuit has mandated that it owes to Cranpark. These are the same unavailing points offered by the losing defendants in Ventas and Wellogix regarding the fixed sums of $101 million and $49 million owed respectively in those cases. (See, e.g., Doc. 245-7 (defendant argued that it faced “irreparable” harm if forced to pay the total amount owed).) These are also the same arguments Rogers already made to the Sixth Circuit seeking a stay, which it rejected. 

This part of Rogers’ brief is where it reveals that it has everything backwards. The party disrupting the standard process is not Cranpark—it’s Rogers. They lost. The $15.6 million part of this case is done. Rogers tried to seek en banc review in the Sixth Circuit. No judge of that court even requested a vote for en banc review. Rogers sought to stay the mandate in the Sixth Circuit. That was rejected. All of this means that Cranpark is entitled—after 18 years—to its money. And, just like the plaintiffs in Ventas and Wellogix, it is entitled to the money now. Rogers is now holding onto Cranpark’s money and refusing to release it. Rogers is the party disrupting the normal process of civil justice. Rogers claims it will seek review in the Supreme Court. Whether it does or not has no bearing on this Court’s obligation to enforce the mandate. 

Those efforts, though, have little chance of any success whatsoever. Rogers’ purported “circuit split” and consultation with former Solicitor General Clement are of little moment. There really is no “split” as to this case because no court has ever held that Article III standing is eliminated by a defendant’s claim that the lawsuit was sold while not considering the document in the record governing that supposed sale. More fundamentally, there was no sale in this case. The Supreme Court will not be interested in addressing a purported “split” regarding the sale of the right to sue by granting review in a case where no sale even occurred—this is what is known in Supreme Court parlance as a “vehicle problem.” These problems, along with the Sixth Circuit’s unanimous opinion describing the substantive and procedural flaws in Rogers’ view of the facts and the law, speak volumes about why the Supreme Court will deny certiorari here and would not enter a stay. All of this likely explains why Rogers informed this Court that it was not seeking a stay from the Supreme Court, and why instead Rogers is coming to this Court claiming that it has authority to stop payment of the $15.6 million, when this Court simply has no such authority. Again, Rogers is free to seek certiorari. But this Court must now comply with the mandate and order Rogers to pay the $15.6 million it indisputably owes to Cranpark. Next, the interest calculation must be decided by this Court. That is the only “orderly resolution” of this case that complies with the Sixth Circuit’s mandate and our system of civil litigation. 

D. There is no authority for this Court to stay the payment of the $15.6 million as provided by the higher court’s mandate. 

Rogers next claims that there are three specific sources of authority for this Court to stay the mandate of the Sixth Circuit and stop payment of the $15.6 million owed to Cranpark. As shown, that is not true.

First, Rogers claims that this Court has the authority to stop payment based on the district court’s inherent authority to control its docket. Well, yes, of course the district court has authority to control its own docket—and it will exercise that authority in the process of resolving the interest calculation, which is the unresolved portion of the case. But again, the first part of the case—the $15.6 million—is fixed, and it is done. As Ventas and Wellogix show, there is no authority to stop payment of that fixed amount. (See Doc. 245-1 at 4–5 (explaining that district courts lack authority to stay that mandate).) Rogers relies on cases where the district court merely stayed proceedings for the unresolved aspects of the case. Judge Wells’s decision in Moore v. Haviland, 607 F. Supp. 2d 867 (N.D. Ohio 2009), is similarly irrelevant here. That case didn’t even involve an argument regarding the district court’s underlying authority to enter a stay, and the matter involved unresolved proceedings after habeas corpus relief regarding the release or retrial of a violent felon. Id. This Court’s obligation is to enforce the mandate. The Court should not be led into error by Rogers. 

Second, Rogers says this Court has authority to stay the payment based on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Not so. Indeed, Rogers cites no case where a district court has relied on the All Writs Act to stay a higher court’s mandate—let alone a case where the district court has stayed payment of a fixed amount of damages, such as the $15.6 million mandated here. This is because the All Writs Act does not apply when there is a statute that covers the issue at hand. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr’s v. United States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S 34, 43 (1985) (“Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.”). As explained in Cranpark’s brief, the process for stays pending certiorari is governed by a statute: 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f). That statute provides that the power to stay the mandate in this case now rests with the Supreme Court only. The losing defendant in Wellogix tried this same last-gasp argument as well. 

Third, Rogers says Federal Rule 62(d) gives this Court authority to stay the payment. This, too, is mistaken. And this, too, was argued by the losing defendants in Ventas and Wellogix. Rule 62 allows for stays pending appeal, not for stays after an appellate mandate pending certiorari review. See, e.g., Ventas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93282, at *6 (“The power of a district court to grant a stay of judgment pending appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) terminates when the Court of Appeals issues its mandate.”) (alterations omitted). 

* * * 

The state of affairs is quite simple. The Sixth Circuit has mandated that this Court reinstate the $15.6 million fixed verdict amount. There is no dispute on that point. This Court therefore must effectuate the mandate and enter an order requiring Rogers to pay that amount to Cranpark immediately. As Rogers has stated, if the Court issues that order, Rogers “would pay the judgment if no court stays the judgment/enforcement.” (Doc. 252 at 9 n.1.) The only unresolved part of this case is the calculation of interest, which this Court is also tasked to determine under the mandate, and which is discussed below.  

[brief continues]